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Zoning and
Land Use
Planning
PATRICIA E. SALKIN*
Law of the Land - Year
in Review
During the summer of 2007
I embarked on a new venture to
develop a blog on land use law.
The idea behind the blog, titled
‘‘Law of the Land,’’ (see:
http://lawoftheland.albanylaw.
edu) was to create a site of interest to land use lawyers, planners, developers, professors
and students. After surveying a
variety of blogs, websites and
publications, the concept behind the blog was developed a site that would be updated
daily with a review of a recent
land use case decided by a state
or federal court. Whenever possible, the case review would be
preceded or followed by brief
*

commentary explaining the
signicance of the case or the
lesson learned. In addition, the
site has reported on some relevant gubernatorial executive
orders, oers book reviews,
and occasionally starts a discussion on current events issues, such as climate change.
Readers can post comments
about the case or posting of the
day, and sometimes this has led
to robust debate about the holdings in particular land use
cases. The site also contains
links to other blogs about land
use and zoning law, links to
websites of interest, and a listing of upcoming land use law
conferences.
With more than 100 reported
cases discussed on the blog, the
largest number of cases addressed takings, followed by
the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act,
signs, due process, nonconforming uses, adult business
uses, ethics, and historic preservation. Wireless communications, vested rights, standing
and issues involving zoning interpretation were also the sub-
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Planning Law Handbook (Thomson West), co-editor of the monthly Zoning
and Planning Law Report (Thomson West), and author of the forthcoming 5th
edition of Anderson’s American Law of Zoning (Thomson West).
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ject of litigation. A signicant
number of zoning cases were
decided by the federal courts,
and Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut. This column
reviews trends and interesting
cases in land use law as reported on Law of the Land during the last half of 2007.
Adult Entertainment
Facilities
Two of the reported adult
entertainment facilities opinions determined that local zoning ordinances were unconstitutional. The rst case, H.D.V.Greektown, LLC v. City of
Detroit, 2007 WL 2261418,
involved Detroit, Michigan’s
adult entertainment ordinance.
Following 1999 amendments
to the zoning ordinance of the
City of Detroit, the plainti’s
establishment, ‘‘The Zoo
Bar,’’ a topless entertainment
business, was grandfathered in
as a nonconforming use in the
City’s Zone B6 (the Central
Business District). In 2002, another business entered into a
conditional purchase agreement to acquire all of the plainti’s assets, including a liquor
license, topless activity permit
and cabaret license. The State
Liquor Control Commission
forwarded the application to

the City for its consideration.
In 2003 and 2004 the City
passed resolutions which in essence stated that where there
are application requests for approval and/or transfer of licenses that have been issued by the
State Liquor Control Commission, including topless activity
permits, and where the bar
making the request is a nonconforming use, located in a district where the use is no longer
allowed, there will be a presumptive disapproval by the
City Council. The plaintis initiated this lawsuit in March
2006, preceding the City Council’s November 2006 rejection
of their transfer application,
challenging the constitutionality of the adult use provisions
of the City’s zoning ordinance,
including the fact there are no
time constraints imposed upon
them to evaluate an application
or to render a decision; and alleging that by requiring two
levels of approval from the City
an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech exists.
The federal court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
held that the local law did
amount to an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech since
it lacked specic standards to
guide the decision-maker in
judging whether a permit
485
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should be issued. Furthermore,
the Court pointed out that a
‘‘prior restraint that fails to
place limits on the time within
which the decision-maker must
issue the license is impermissible.’’ The Court noted with
concern that the conditional
use permit, the planned development and the regulated use
provisions of the City’s zoning
ordinance fail to provide deadlines for the granting or denying of applications by the appropriate governmental body.
As a result, the Court concluded that the zoning ordinance violates the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a prior restraint on
speech.
The second case nding an
unconstitutional regulatory
scheme arose in the Village of
Washington Park, Illinois,
where apparently, the Village
relies on this industry for almost all of its income. In Joelner v. Village of Washington
Park, Illinois, 2007 WL
4064511, the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals examined a Village
ordinance designed to regulate
adult entertainment facilities
by expanding the permissible
hours of operation after dark,
mandating that the establishments close in the morning between 6:00 a.m. and 11:00
486

a.m., allowing partial nudity
and on-site masturbation (but
neither patrons nor employees
can appear in ‘‘a state of complete nudity’’), and prohibiting
the sale or consumption of alcohol on site except in ‘‘entities licensed as adult cabarets
under prior Village ordinances.’’ The ordinance contains both a preamble and ndings asserting that the
ordinance aims ‘‘to establish
reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the deleterious
secondary eects of sexually
oriented businesses within the
Village.’’ The Village did not
conduct its own secondary effects study, but rather referenced the ‘‘ndings and narrowing constructions’’ in 19
listed federal court opinions.
While some of these opinions
refer to secondary eects of
combining alcohol with adult
entertainment, the Court notes
that none of them claim that allowing alcohol sales to continue at already-operating venues and banning it only from
future establishments ameliorates the harm from combining
the two. The Plainti had been
trying to obtain a permit to operate a cabaret in the Village
for some time, and alleged that
as a result of local politics, he
has been unable to secure the
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needed permits. He alleged that
the alcohol ban at issue was
adopted not to address secondary eects, but rather to stie
competition with current cabaret license holders who would
still be able to serve alcohol,
making it impossible for his
business venue to compete.
The 7th Circuit noted that
the three prong test to be applied to the ordinance banning
alcohol is a two-stage process:
1) whether the ordinance was
passed pursuant to a legitimate
governmental power; 2)
whether it does not totally ban
all adult entertainment; and 3)
whether it is aimed at combating the negative secondary effects caused by adult entertainment establishments. If all
three prongs are satised, the
ordinance is constitutional if it
survives intermediate scrutiny
(e.g., substantial governmental
interest, narrowly tailored and
reasonable alternative avenues
of communication are available). However, where the
regulation is not aimed at secondary eects (it fails the third
prong) then strict scrutiny applies (e.g., regulation must be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that end). In
upholding the nding of the
trial court, the Circuit Court

found that backdated licenses
(to allow others, and not the
plainti, to serve alcohol at
their facilities); expansion of
hours of operation (rather than
limiting hours); and proof of
lack of enforcement of an existing prohibition on complete
nudity; all supported the plainti’s allegation that the new
ordinance was not designed to
address negative secondary effects of adult entertainment,
but rather to limit competition.
Therefore, under a strict scrutiny analysis, the ordinance was
unconstitutional because a
‘‘ban on alcohol in only newly
licensed establishments can not
possibly be considered less narrowly tailored.’’ The Court
noted that the ordinance permanently insulates eight concentrated establishments from the
ban and leaves alcohol use at
those establishments otherwise
entirely unrestricted, and that
the Court had previously held
in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of
Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (2003),
that ‘‘a complete ban of alcohol
in the premises of adult entertainment establishments is the
only way the Village can advance that interest.’’
Ordinances regulating adult
entertainment facilities were
upheld in a number of other
cases. For example, in Smartt
487

REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 36: 484 2008]

v. City of Laredo, 2007 WL
3087495, a Texas Appeals
Court upheld the application of
sexually oriented business
regulations to an existing use
in an annexed area. In 1995, a
business involving nude dancers was established outside the
city limits. In 1998, the property was annexed by the City
and the City amended its existing ordinance to require the
previously existing sexually
oriented businesses to obtain a
license to operate and to refrain
from operating within 1,000
feet of a residential area. The
city obtained an injunction
from operating against the
owner of this business since it
was within 1,000 feet of a residential area. The business
owner argued that his use was
‘‘grandfathered’’ because the
business was operating prior to
the annexation. The Court
found no authority for such a
proposition, and noted that the
Texas Supreme Court has held
that under reasonable conditions, zoning ordinances may
be applied to end previously
existing nonconforming uses.
The business owner next argued that his business is not an
‘‘establishment,’’ which is the
word used in the regulations. In
reviewing the denition and the
activities that take place on the
488

premises, the Court concluded
that evidence existed to support
the lower court’s determination
that the use constituted a
‘‘sexually oriented business’’
irrespective of the denition of
‘‘establishment.’’ As to the
constitutionality of the regulations, the Court held that the
regulation was content neutral
and that regulating the negative
secondary eects of such a use
amount to a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction.
The Court noted that the regulations did not completely ban
the use, and that ‘‘a municipality has a substantial interest in
preserving the quality of urban
life . . . .’’
In denying a motion for a
preliminary injunction in Bottoms Up Enterprises, Inc. v.
Borough of Homestead, 2007
WL 2908762, the Western District of Pennsylvania determined that the Township’s zoning, licensing and regulatory
provisions restricting adult entertainment establishments did
not violate the First Amendment. Here the Plaintis sought
to open a high-end supper club
with semi-nude dancing in a
central business district that
permitted restaurants but prohibited adult live entertainment
facilities and exotic dance
clubs with nude performers.
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After the plainti’s attorney
indicated that the performers
would not be nude, the Borough Council amended the definition of ‘‘adult live entertainment facility’’ in the zoning
ordinance to specically include references to performers
wearing g-strings and opaque
coverings, or ‘‘pasties,’’ and
they enacted an ordinance to
increase from 500 feet to 1,000
feet the setback requirement
between any adult use and certain ‘‘sensitive uses’’ which
include primary and secondary
schools, places of worship,
parks, day-care centers, child
nursery schools, a library, an
existing dwelling not owned by
the owner of the adult use, or
any site marked on the ocial
map as a proposed future park.
The Borough asserted that
these ordinances were reasonable time, place and manner
regulations of speech, and that
they were aimed at combating
the negative secondary eects
caused by adult live entertainment facilities, they were narrowly tailored, and that they
were not directed at suppressing the erotic message. Furthermore, such facilities were allowed in the second largest
zoning district in the municipality subject to conditional
use permit review. The Plain-

tis did not le an application
for a permit, but rather initiated
a lawsuit alleging that there
was no evidence that the ordinances were aimed at combating negative secondary eects
when the ordinances were enacted (because this information
was stated subsequent to the
adoption), and that their facility would not be able to be sited
in the other zoning district that
conditionally allowed such
uses due to the amount of land
available and the existence of
restrictive covenants.
The Court held that it could
consider testimony presented
regarding the legislative purpose for the enactment of the
ordinances since the Third Circuit has held that ‘‘a municipality can support its ordinance
with a factual basis even if that
basis was not present to the
legislative body prior to the
enactment of the measure at issue.’’ The Court then considered the type of information or
evidence relied upon regarding
secondary eects, and concluded that ‘‘studies from other
urban environments are relevant and do provide a connection to actual adult businesses.’’ The Court further
concluded that the increase in
the setback provision did not
directly aect the plaintis
489
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since they had not applied to
locate a use in that zoning district, and that there were adequate alternatives available. In
relying on City of Renton, 475
U.S. at 53 and Dia v. City of
Toledo, 937 F. Supp. 673, 678
(N.D. Ohio 1996), the court
concluded that regardless of
whether they considered the
Borough’s assertion that there
would be 52 acres of land available to site the use (14% of the
total acreage of the municipality), or the plaintis’ assertion
that there would be 19 acres
available (5% of the total acreage), even using the lower
number there is sucient land
available.
In another case, Tollis Inc.,
v. County of San Diego, 2007
WL 2937012, the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the
City of San Diego’s regulation
requiring the location of adult
uses in industrial zones. In
2002, to combat the negative
secondary eects that concentrate in and around adult businesses, the County of San Diego adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance addressing
adult entertainment businesses
located within the unincorporated portions of the county.
Among other things, the law
restricts the hours of operation
of these businesses, requires re490

moval of doors on peep show
booths and mandates dispersal
of these businesses to industrial
areas within the county. The
plaintis alleged both federal
and state constitutional violations. The District Court
granted summary judgment to
the County, upholding the requirement that adult establishments locate only in industrial
zones, and it dismissed the state
law claim regarding conformance to the County’s general
plan (because the plainti
failed to raise the claim in its
complaint). The District Court
did hold unconstitutional the
County’s permitting system for
adult establishments since it
granted the licensing authority
an unreasonably long period of
time to consider a permit request. By severing the oending time limits from the ordinance, the Court was able to
uphold the rest of the law.
In upholding the industrial
zone restriction, the Court examined the third prong of the
Renton test, to wit, that the
regulation must serve a substantial government interest, be
narrowly tailored to serve that
interest, and allow for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication. The plaintis
argued that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Alameda Books
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imposed a heightened evidentiary burden on the County to
show ‘‘how speech would
fare’’ under the ordinance. The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with
this interpretation, explaining
that ‘‘So long as there are a sufcient number of suitable relocation sites, the County could
reasonably assume that, given
the draw of pornographic and
sexually explicit speech, willing patrons would not be measurably discouraged by the inconvenience of having to travel
to an industrial zone.’’ The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the
District Court’s determination
that 68 potential sites were
available in the industrial
zones, on which eight to 10
adult businesses could operate,
and that this was sucient to
allow the plainti to relocate.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the District Court’s dismissal
of the state claim for failure to
raise it in the complaint, but
disagreed with the District
Court’s manner of severance of
the oending period of time for
processing an adult business
license. The Ninth Circuit said
that once the oending time
limit is removed from the text
of the ordinance (in this case it
was between 130 and 140
days), then the ordinance contains no time limits at all for the

review of license requests, and
that too is unconstitutional. The
Ninth Circuit remanded this issue to the District Court to correct its severance order which
should still sever the oending
section and no longer require
the license until such time as
the ordinance is amended. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that
the remaining provisions of the
local ordinance would continue
to remain in eect.
Condemnation/Eminent
Domain
Post Kelo, eminent domain,
once a specialty for attorneys
concentrating in condemnation
law, has been prominent on the
radar screen of land use lawyers. Two recent cases warrant
mention in this column. In December, a New York appellate
court held that eminent domain
could be used to preserve farmland in In the Matter of Aspen
Creek Estates Ltd. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 2007 WL
4246603. The ‘‘Manorville
Farmland Protection Area’’
within
the
Town
of
Brookhaven is an approximately 500-acre working farm
belt that is a high priority preservation target for the Town.
The Town had previously acquired development rights to
four farms in the area, preserv491
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ing approximately 112 acres of
farmland. The Appellate Division, Second Department upheld the Town’s decision to
exercise its power of eminent
domain to condemn property in
the protection area for the purpose of preserving its use as
farmland because such action
serves a legitimate public purpose. The Town Board said that
the property was being acquired to, among other things,
‘‘preserve open space and agricultural resources, protect and
promote continuation of agriculture in the Town, ensure the
continued sale of fresh, locally
grown produce, prevent conicts between residential
homeowners and adjacent
farmers.’’ Furthermore, the
Board found that the condemnation would help to ensure the
protection of scenic vistas and
the rural character of the area.
Prior to initiating the condemnation action, the Town sought
to acquire the property through
a negotiated sale. The Town’s
Open Space Environmental
Bond Act Committee had authorized purchase of the land in
2003, but the current owners
(Aspen Creek) were in negotiation to purchase it as well and
they outbid the Town, purchasing the property in 2004 for
$1.4 million. Thereafter, the
492

Town attempted to purchase
the development rights to the
property from Aspen Creek,
and after a series of oers, the
Town increased its bid to $4.
004 million, which was roughly
half a million dollars more than
the highest appraisal, and also
oered to let Aspen build three
houses on the property. After
this oer was rejected, the
Town began the process of acquiring the property and development rights through condemnation.
Among other things, Aspen
Creek argued that the Town’s
condemnation violated the
State’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) because it
did not serve a public purpose
and because the Town’s true
intent was to take the subject
property and lease it to private
farmers. With respect to the issue of whether the condemnation serves a public purpose,
the Court concluded that the
Town’s stated reasons—preserving farmland, maintaining
open space and scenic vistas—
are all legitimate public purposes. The Court noted that the
preservation of farmland ‘‘confers a benet upon the public,
since it enables residents of the
Town to enjoy locally grown
produce and scenic views.’’
The Court also found that the
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preservation of farmland is
consistent with the public
policy of the State to ‘‘promote, foster, and encourage the
agricultural industry,’’ (citing
to N.Y. Ag. & Mkts. L. sec. 3)
and ‘‘preservation of open
space and enhancement of natural resources.’’ (citing to N.Y.
Gen. Mun. L. sec. 247[1]).
Lastly, the Court noted that the
Town residents believe that
protection of open spaces and
natural resources is important
because they overwhelmingly
supported a $20 million bond
act of such purpose in 2002 and
a bond act of up to $100 million in 2004 for preservation of
open space, farmland and wildlife habitats. As to Aspen’s
claim that the condemnation is
unconstitutional because the
true purpose is to bestow a private benet on certain individuals (e.g., farmers), the Court
found that this allegation had
no factual support in the record
and is insucient to demonstrate bad faith. The Court said
that ‘‘the mere fact that the
condemnation will provide incidental benets to private individuals does not invalidate the
condemnor’s determination as
long as the public purpose is
dominant.’’ Further, the Court
maintained that since the land
had been continuously farmed

for more than a century prior to
the Aspen purchase, ‘‘allowing
farming to continue on the
property is fully consistent with
the purpose of the condemnation, the fact that one or more
individuals may benet is
merely incidental, and does not
render the public benet to be
achieved by condemnation illusory.’’ The Court said that a
comprehensive development
plan was not required pursuant
to Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005), because
that condemnation was based
upon the public purpose of economic development, and here
the public purpose was farmland and open space protection.
In a case dealing with the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and eminent domain, the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that RLUIPA
does not apply to the condemnation of a religious cemetery.
In St. John’s United Church of
Christ v. The City of Chicago,
502 F.3d 616, the Court held
that the O’Hare Modernization
Act (the ‘‘OMA’’), which,
among other things, amended
the Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (IRFRA) and
excluded the O’Hare expansion
project from IRFRA’s reach,
does not violate the U.S. Con493
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stitution or the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The State
Legislature passed the OMA in
2003 to facilitate improvements and expansion to the airport. St. John’s United Church
claimed that the City’s attempt
to condemn a cemetery located
on Church property violated
the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and the
RLUIPA.
On the Constitutional claims
the Court found that the ‘‘object’’ of the OMA was to clear
all legal obstacles to the
O’Hare expansion project, and
not to target the religious cemeteries that (among many other
properties) the City needs to
acquire. Hence the inquiry required in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) was
satised because the OMA did
not ‘‘infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation.’’ The Court
concluded that, ‘‘there is nothing inherently religious about
cemeteries or graves, and the
act of relocating them thus does
not on its face infringe upon a
religious practice, as Lukumi
uses that term.’’ In dismissing
the Equal Protection claim, the
494

Court found that the statute did
not classify St. John’s cemetery
on the basis of religion, and
further that the airport expansion was a compelling governmental interest.
With respect to the RLUIPA
claim, interestingly, the Court
started by stating that they assumed the constitutionality of
the statute based upon the U. S.
Supreme Court holding in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005), but since the constitutionality of the land use section
of RLUIPA was not raised by
the parties here, they were saving that issue for another day.
The Court next turned to the
denition of ‘‘land use regulation’’ in the statute, which provides, ‘‘[A] zoning or landmarking law, or the application
of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant’s use or
development of land (including
a structure axed to land), if
the claimant has an ownership,
leasehold, easement, servitude,
or other property interest in the
regulated land or a contract or
option to acquire such an interest.’’ (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(5)).The Court determined
that RLUIPA did not apply
here because the OMA was not
a ‘‘land use regulation.’’ In doing so, the Court commented
on the distinction between zon-
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ing and eminent domain and
cited Faith Temple Church v.
Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp.
2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
Nonconforming Uses
A signicant number of
cases focused on whether applicants were entitled to nonconforming use status on their
land. Typically, when establishing a legally existing nonconforming business use, owners will produce all kinds of
records to demonstrate that the
business was operational prior
to the enactment of the zoning
or zoning amendment. In this
case, the property owner was
able to do that, but the court
relied on the small amount of
revenue generated from the use
during that time to determine
that the use was not signicant
enough to qualify for nonconforming status. As a result, the
court never got to what might
have been the more appropriate inquiry—whether the
change in intensity constituted
an impermissible enlargement
or expansion of a nonconforming use.
The South Dakota Supreme
Court, in City of Platte v. Overweg, 2007 WL 2460112, noted
that prior to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance, the property
owner was employed at an au-

tomobile garage, but that he
moonlighted doing occasional
auto repair work from his residence, located in a residentialonly district. The Court, in considering sales tax reports the
business owner submitted to
the State, showing under $200
in income prior to the adoption
of the zoning ordinance, determined that during that time the
business use of the property
was minimal and sporadic. The
court noted that only after the
eective date of the zoning ordinance did the business use
increase in intensity. Specically, subsequent to the eective date of the zoning ordinance, the property owner quit
his primary employment and
opened up his own glass and
auto repair shop on his residentially zoned property. As a result, the Court said the property
owner failed to meet his burden
to ‘‘clearly establish the prior
use to avail himself of the
grandfather rights.’’
Similarly, in Michigan, the
law does not allow property
owners to acquire nonconforming use status in their land if the
use has not been fully operational prior to new or changed
zoning. In Vanfarowe v. Cascade Charter Township, 2007
WL 3309920, the Michigan
Appellate Court remanded a
495
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case involving a special use
permit to construct a boat
launch on a lot owned by a
homeowners association to determine whether the lot is entitled to nonconforming use
status. The lot at issue was conveyed to the Goodwood Plat
Owners, Inc. (GPO) in 1950 as
part of a riverfront subdivision
development. In 1991, the
owners of the lots in the Goodwood Plat, upon discovering
that the GPO has lapsed as a
corporation for failure to le
annual reports, formed the current GPO by incorporation in
1992, ling a successful suit to
conrm ownership of the
deeded lot for the boat launch.
A quitclaim deed was executed
to the GPO in 1996 subject to
certain owage rights and restrictions in the zoning ordinance. The lot is only 75 feet
wide, but the zoning regulation
requires a minimum of 100 feet
of lake frontage. Following a
public hearing, the Township
granted GPO a special use permit, determining that the 100
foot minimum did not apply
because the GPO was entitled
to nonconforming use status,
going back to the 1950 dedication. The Township, however,
made no ndings of fact as to
how the lot in question had
been used in the past. Neigh496

bors appealed, alleging among
other things, that the determination that the lot was entitled
to nonconforming use status
was without basis in law and
not based upon any material
evidence claiming that there
has been no tangible change in
the land nor work of a substantial character performed on the
property.
In reviewing the case law in
Michigan with respect to nonconforming uses, the Court
noted that to acquire nonconforming use status, ‘‘there must
be work of a ‘substantial character’ done by way of preparation for an actual use of the
premises.’’ The Court noted
that in previous Michigan
cases, the following activities
were not enough to entitle owners to nonconforming use status: obtaining a building permit, ordering plans, surveying
property, tearing down a barn
and moving a house (City of
Lansing v. Dawley, 247 Mich.
394); construction of a road,
surveying and subdividing a
plat, grading and excavating
the sites, and installing 11 mobile homes (Gackler Land Co.,
Inc. v. Yankee Springs Twp.,
427 Mich. 562); development
of a site plan, the clearing of
trees and the construction of a
commercial well and well-
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house (Heath Twp. v. Sall, 442
Mich. 434); and obtaining nancing, purchasing insurance,
application for permits, designing of barn and manure pit layouts, obtaining quotes for the
construction and signed contracts with suppliers, grading
the site and construction of the
barn and manure sewage system (Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze,
241 Mich. App. 324).
Because there were no ndings of fact in the record below
as to what, if any, work of a
substantial nature had been
done to the lot, the Court remanded the matter. However,
based upon the long list of activities deemed not to be substantial by Michigan courts, it
appears as though it will be
very dicult for the property
owners to establish nonconforming use status in this case,
and seeking a variance may be
an alternative course of action
to pursue.

part to the failure of Congress
to dene key terms in the statute, which is requiring the
courts to interpret legislative
intent and constitutional standards of review. Unfortunately,
the district courts and circuit
courts have also failed to arrive
at uniform denitions and tests,
creating even more confusion
and uncertainty for applicants
and municipalities alike. All
eyes were on the Supreme
Court this fall when they had
an opportunity to grant cert in
the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals case of Vision Church,
United Methodist v. Village of
Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975.
Many RLUIPA case followers
were disappointed that the
Court denied cert, leaving for
another day the opportunity to
review the constitutionality of
the statute, as well as a uniform
test for what constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion and what constitutes
a compelling government interReligious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons est to justify a regulation that
does impose a substantial burAct (RLUIPA)
den on religious exercise. What
A large number of reported follows are just a few examples
cases in the last six months of of recent RLUIPA cases of in2007 focused on the siting of terest.
religious uses. Most of these
The 7th Circuit Court of Apcases were brought under peals saw the most RLUIPA
RLUIPA. The substantial activity in the last six months
amount of litigation is due in with three reported decisions.
497
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The rst one was previously
discussed in the condemnation/
eminent domain section. In the
Village of Long Grove (Illinois) case, cited above, the
Church sued alleging that the
Village’s denial of their application for voluntary annexation, its subsequent involuntary annexation of their
property, its enactment of a
municipal Public Assembly
Ordinance, and its denial of
their applications for a special
use permit to build and occupy
a church on real property it had
purchased violated the 1st and
14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (‘‘RLUIPA’’), and various Illinois
laws. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of
the Village and the Seventh
Circuit armed. According to
the Village’s ‘‘Comprehensive
Plan,’’ it is dedicated to preserving its ‘‘rural character,’’
to the ‘‘provision of a quiet
countryside’’ and to the enjoyment of ‘‘open space.’’ The
Zoning Regulations permit religious institutions (and other
uses) as ‘‘special uses’’ in areas zoned as ‘‘R1,’’ ‘‘R2’’ and
‘‘R3’’ Residential Districts. At
the time of the initial application, the property owned by Vi498

sion Church was not located in
the Village boundaries, but in
its application, the Church requested as a condition of annexation that the Village zone
its property ‘‘Residential
(R2)’’ and grant it a ‘‘special
use’’ permit to construct a
church complex on the property. Vision’s proposed plans
called for a 99,000-square foot
church facility, consisting of
ve main buildings and a sanctuary with over 1,000 seats. At
the request of the Village, the
Church submitted a revised
plan, decreasing the size of the
church to 56,200 square feet,
consisting of three main buildings (a sanctuary, an administration building and a Sunday
school building); the sanctuary
would seat 600 instead of
1,000; and parking spaces were
reduced from 400 to 240. In addition, the Church agreed to
comply with some, but not all,
of the Village’s conditions on
construction. In August 2001,
the Plan Commission voted to
recommend the denial of the
Church’s application for annexation, and this recommendation was accepted by the Village Board of Trustees.
Subsequently, due to an annexation of an adjacent piece or
property, the Village involuntarily annexed the Church
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property. The Village zoned
the property ‘‘R2’’ Residential,
the zoning classication sought
by the Church in its June 2000
application for voluntary annexation. In April 2002 an
amendment to the Village’s
Zoning Regulations was enacted restricting the size and
capacity of buildings used for
‘‘public assembly,’’ such as
‘‘religious institutions, aquariums, libraries, museums, private schools, and other similar
uses.’’ (‘‘Assembly Ordinance’’) Specically, it provides that a complex comprised
of three buildings located on
fteen or more acres, but not
fronting a state highway, cannot exceed a total square footage of 55,000. It also imposes
restrictions on parking, setbacks from the road and the
ow of trac. In January 2002,
approximately four months
prior to the passage of the Assembly Ordinance, the Church
applied for such a permit. However, instead of the 56,200square foot complex discussed
in March 2001 during negotiations over voluntary annexation, the Church requested approval in its special use
application for the original
99,000-square foot, 5-building,
1,000-seat sanctuary facility
originally proposed in 2000.
The application was denied.

The Circuit court found that
by permitting churches in all
residential districts as a special
use, the municipality has not
completely or totally excluded
religious assemblies from its
jurisdiction, and the Court
noted that six churches currently operate within the Village. The Court continued,
‘‘The requirement that
churches obtain a special use
permit is neutral on its face and
is justied by legitimate, nondiscriminatory municipal planning goals.’’ The Court further
held that the land use regulations violated neither the Establishment Clause nor the equal
terms clause of RLUIPA since
they applied equally to all assembly uses, whether or not
religious in nature.
In a second case, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the exclusion of religious
uses from a buer zone might
violate RLUIPA’s ‘‘equal
terms’’ provision. Arising in
Indiana, Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis,
2007 WL 3151201 involved a
Baptist Church that leased
space in a building located in a
C-1 district, designated as a
commercial oce-buer district, and religious uses were
not allowed in the district without rst obtaining a variance.
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The Seventh Circuit overturned
the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction requested by the Church nding
that such requirement may violate the equal terms provision
of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) since other similar
uses are allowed as of right (42
U.S.C. sec. 2000cc et seq. forbids local governments from
imposing or implementing a
land use regulation ‘‘in a manner . . . that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less
than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution’’).
Among the uses allowed in a
C-1 district without the need
for a variance are: assistedliving facilities, auditoriums,
assembly halls, community
centers, senior citizen centers
and day-care centers. Although
the City pointed out that
churches are allowed in SU-1
districts (special use), the Court
noted that even if it was an oset, it could not eliminate any
discrimination if such was
found to exist. The Court also
stated that the existence of alternative sites for the church is
only relevant when the zoning
ordinance is challenged as imposing a ‘‘substantial burden’’
on religious use of land. Al500

though the District Court also
found persuasive the fact that
State law forbids the sale of
alcohol within 200 feet of a
church and pornography within
500 feet, and these two uses are
allowed in the C-1 district, the
Circuit Court rst noted that no
evidence suggests that either
use is currently in existence,
and to argue that the government has created ‘‘protective
zones’’ for religion constitutes
discrimination in favor of religion. The Court said, ‘‘Government cannot, by granting
churches special privileges
. . . furnish the premise for
excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts.’’ Since
the Court concluded that the
church’s claim that the City is
violating RLUIPA has at least
some, and possibly great, merit,
it was an error for the District
Court to deny the church a temporary injunction.
In a long awaited decision
from the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 2007 WL 3011061, the
Court found not only that the
Village violated RLUIPA because the denial of approvals
for the expansion of a religious
school constituted a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion and the Village failed to

ZONING AND LAND USE PLANNING

prove a compelling governmental interest to justify the
burden, but more signicantly,
for the rst time this Circuit
Court determined that the statute is constitutional. Early
RLUIPA cases in the district
courts led some practitioners to
believe that perhaps RLUIPA
was unconstitutional. With
most of the Circuit Court of
Appeals now weighing in on
the subject, however, there is
less conict as the Appeals
Courts are nding the Act constitutional.
This decision was the latest
in a ve year battle between the
Village of Mamaroneck, NY
and the Westchester Hebrew
Day School over the construction of a new school building.
The School rst submitted an
application to the zoning board
for modication of its special
use permit to enable it to proceed with a $12 million expansion project in October 2001.
In February 2002, the Board
voted unanimously to issue a
negative declaration under the
State Environmental Quality
Review Act, meaning the project would have no signicant
environmental impacts. Following public opposition, the
negative declaration was rescinded in August 2002. Rather
than submit a full Environmen-

tal Impact Statement, the
school commenced a lawsuit
alleging that the rescission violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). Following a
ruling by the District court in
2002 that the negative declaration was not properly rescinded, the zoning board held
hearings on the merits of the
application and denied the application in May 2003. The denial was based upon the impact
of the project on trac, concerns over parking and the intensity of the use, but these
grounds were identied after
the hearings and aording no
opportunity for the School to
respond. The District Court determined that the denial was
not supported by evidence in
the record. After a number of
procedural issues decided by
the District Court and the Circuit Court, following a sevenday bench trial in November
2005, the Court ordered the
Village to issue the special permit, and the Village appealed.
The Second Circuit said that
the expansion of a school building used for religious purposes
constitutes an exercise of religion. The Court explained that
the following uses, just because
they may be proposed by a religious organization, might not
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constitute a ‘‘religious exercise:’’ a school gymnasium
used soley for sporting activities; the building of a residence
on school property for a headmaster; and the construction of
additional oce space for a
school. None of these were at
issue in this case. With respect
to substantial burden, the Second Circuit adopted the coercion test set forth in the 11th
Circuit’s Midrashi opinion
(366 F.3d 1214), stating that
‘‘when there has been a denial
of a religious institution’s
building application, courts appropriately speak of government action that directly coerces the religious institution to
change its behavior, rather than
government action that forces
the religious entity to choose
between religious precepts and
government benets.’’ The
Court said that an absolute rejection of the proposed plan, as
in this case, was dierent from
a rejection of a submitted plan
that left open the possibility of
approval of a resubmission
with modications designed to
address the cited problem.
Whether a conditional approval
will constitute a substantial
burden will depend upon
whether there is a ‘‘reasonable
opportunity for the institution
to submit a modied applica502

tion, the denial does not place
substantial pressure of it to
change its behavior . . . ’’
The Court also noted that a
substantial burden claim may
exist where land use restrictions are imposed arbitrarily,
capriciously or unlawfully. The
Second Circuit noted that in
this case, the Village Zoning
Board acted unlawfully under
New York State law because
their decision was based on
grounds ‘‘unrelated to the public’s health, safety or welfare.’’
In an attempt to show a compelling governmental interest,
the Village raised trac and
parking concerns. While these
are compelling governmental
interests, in this case the Court
found insucient evidence in
the record to prove these were
legitimate concerns, beyond
mere public opposition to the
project. Lastly, with respect to
the Village’s actions, the Court
determined that even if they
could articulate a compelling
governmental interest, the Village did not satisfy the least restrictive means requirement
since their denial of the application was absolute. The
Court relied on the District
Court’s ndings that the ZBA
members were not credible
when they testied that they
would give reasonable consid-
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eration to another application
by the School. The Court said,
‘‘When the board’s expressed
willingness to consider a modied proposal is insincere, we
do not require an institution to
le a modied proposal before
determining that its religious
exercise has been substantially
burdened.’’ Furthermore, the
Court observed that ‘‘The ZBA
had the opportunity to approve
the application subject to conditions, but refused to consider
doing so.’’
Concluding that the Village
violated RLUIPA, the Second
Circuit considered the constitutionality of the Act. The Court
said RLUIPA does not violate
the Commerce Clause (so long
as the jurisdictional element is
satised that there is a minimal
eect on commerce), it does
not run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment (‘‘We do not believe RLUIPA directly compels states to require or prohibit
any particular acts. Instead,
RLUIPA leaves it to each state
to enact and enforce land use
regulations as it deems appropriate so long as the state does
not substantially burden religious exercise in the absence
of a compelling interests
achieved by the least restrictive
means.’’), and that it does not
violate the Establishment

Clause (‘‘the principal primary
eect of RLUIPA’s land use
provisions neither advances
nor inhibits religion.’’).
Signs and Billboards
Perhaps the hottest ‘‘new’’
issue in the area of regulating
signs and billboards has been
how to address electronic message boards, or billboards that
can change the messages every
thirty seconds. A number of
municipalities have started to
discuss and ban the use of these
signs, and the Federal Highway
Administration has published
guidance for states about the
regulation of these digital
signs. Municipalities in New
Hampshire, Kentucky and
Massachusetts have recently
considered and/or enacted bans
on these types of signs, and
practitioners are awaiting a ruling from the First Circuit on the
constitutionality of prohibitions on these types of signs in
the New Hampshire case of
Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of
Concord, United States District
Court, New Hampshire, 2007
WL 1847307.
The City of Concord, New
Hampshire, enacted a sign code
that bans all signs ‘‘that move
or create the illusion of movement, signs which are or appear
to be animated or projected,
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signs that aect or look similar
to trac signs or signals, and
electronic message center
(EMC) type signs’’ without
regard to the content of the
sign. Naser Jewelers, Inc. (NJI)
sought a preliminary injunction
in federal district court. The
magistrate recommended the
preliminary injunction be denied because he concluded that
NJI was unlikely to succeed on
the merits using the Central
Hudson test (Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
The district court agreed
with the proposed disposition,
but disagreed that Central Hudson controls this decision because the city’s sign code is
content neutral. The district
court concluded the sign code
passes constitutional muster
under the time, place, and manner test described in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989). A content-neutral
regulation must meet an ‘‘intermediate scrutiny test,’’ the
regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve a signicant
government interest and allow
for reasonable alternative channels of communication. The
court noted that the city’s interests in trac safety and community aesthetics each constitute a substantial governmental
504

interest. The sign code is sufciently narrowly tailored because the city has not prohibited all signs, ‘‘only those signs
the city plausibly thinks will
adversely aect trac safety,
or prove detrimental to aesthetic values the city seeks to
promote.’’
In an interesting case from
Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth Court held that portable
search lights constitute a sign
under a local zoning ordinance.
In Sutli Enterprises, Inc. v.
Silver Spring Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2007 WL 2827744, A
car dealership told the local
zoning ocer that the portable
searchlights would not be permanently mounted and that the
purpose of the lights would be
to ‘‘call attention generally to
the business locations and on
occasion to specic promotional sales and events.’’ Both
the zoning ocer, and on appeal, the zoning board, concluded that the searchlights
constituted a sign because they
were being used to communicate a message. As such, the
use of the lights were impermissible under the zoning ordinance because it prohibits ‘‘rotating or oscillating signs,’’ and
because the sign ordinance requires that oodlight or spotlights be shielded so that there

ZONING AND LAND USE PLANNING

is no direct light transmitted to
other properties or rights-ofways. The Pennsylvania Appeals Court agreed with the
zoning board that the lights
constituted a ‘‘sign’’ under the
zoning ordinance which denes
‘‘sign’’ as ‘‘[a] device for visual communication that is
used to bring the subject to the
attention of the public . . . .’’
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down three
billboard decisions at the end
of 2007 all upholding the constitutionality of sign ordinances
from the cities of San Diego,
Oakland, and Beaumont. In Get
Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San
Diego, 2007 WL 3197108, after Get Outdoors led twentyfour applications for billboard
permits with the City, the city
ocial informed the representative that the City ordinance
prohibited new billboards, but
agreed to review the applications. Following a review of
the applications, the City denied them, noting that the City
Code prohibits new signs bearing o-site messages, that each
of the permits was missing key
documents, and that the proposed billboards violated the
size and height restrictions in
the City law. In response to the
initial ling of the lawsuit, the
City enacted several legislative

amendments to the law, including a ‘‘message substitution’’
clause, a 45-day deadline for
decisions on all permit applications, and a judicial review provision. As a result, the District
Court granted summary judgment for the City.
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the billboard
size and height restrictions do
not violate the First Amendment because they were a reasonable time, place and manner
regulation designed ‘‘to optimize communication and quality of signs while protecting the
public and aesthetic character
of the City.’’ The Court also
noted that the City had calibrated its size and height restrictions for ‘‘ground signs,’’
which include billboards, to the
width of adjacent public rightsof-way and the speed limit. The
Court determined that the restrictions are not substantially
broader than necessary to protect the City’s interests in trafc safety and aesthetics, they
directly advance the city’s interests, and they leave open
alternative avenues of communication. The Court further
concluded that Get Outdoors
II’s permit applications violated these restrictions, and that
therefore it lacked standing to
challenge the ban on opremises messages.
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The second case, Desert
Outdoor Advertising v. City of
Oakland, 506 F.3d 798, arose
after Desert Outdoor Advertising erected three signs in the
City of Oakland, two of which
were visible from the freeway
and contained commercial advertising unrelated to the premises, and one visible from the
highway that said ‘‘Volunteer
to Be a Big Brother,’’ and
‘‘Pray at First Baptist Church.’’
The City ordered the signs removed as they were in violation of their sign regulations.
The City also denied a variance
request for the noncommercial
signs for failure to meet the
criteria set forth in the local
regulations. Desert Outdoor
brought both a facial and an as
applied challenge to the sign
regulations. The Municipal
Code prohibits signs adjacent
to freeways by providing that,
‘‘[n]o sign shall be erected,
constructed, relocated or maintained in the City of Oakland if
such sign is designed to have or
has the advertising thereon
maintained primarily to be
viewed from a freeway.’’ The
regulation provided for four
exceptions that include: signs
that identify the name of the
person, rm, or business occupying the premises and the
type of business conducted
506

thereon; signs that identify the
product manufactured on the
premises; signs limited to a
certain size relating to the sale,
lease, hire or display of the
building premises, and time
and temperature units. No variances are permitted under the
freeway sign ordinance. The
City Planning Code banned the
construction of new ‘‘advertising signs’’ anywhere within the
City, but prior to the amendment, the Code allowed for
variances only if four conditions were met: 1) strict compliance would result in practical diculty or unnecessary
hardship inconsistent with the
zoning regulations, due to
unique physical or topographic
circumstances or conditions of
design; 2) strict compliance
would deprive the applicant of
the privileges enjoyed by owners of similarly zoned property;
3) a variance could not adversely aect character, livability, or appropriate development of abutting properties or
the surrounding area, or be detrimental to the public welfare;
and 4) a variance cannot constitute a grant of special privilege. The third condition was
repealed during the pendency
of the lawsuit.
With respect to the facial
challenge to the sign provisions
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in the Municipal Code, the
Court noted that the regulations
ban only signs that are visible
from the highway and that contain advertising, or commercial
speech. The Court said that
‘‘advertising’’ does not imply
noncommercial speech. The
regulations the municipality
relied on to deny the noncommercial signs were contained in
the Oakland Planning Code,
and not the Oakland Municipal
Code, the regulation that Desert
challenged. Although Desert
argued that the Municipal Code
provision contained unconstitutional content-based exceptions, the Court found that of
all of the exemptions, the only
one that was problematic was
the exception for time and temperature units (because this is
noncommercial speech), and
the Court concluded that this
particular exception was not
enough to demonstrate that the
City intended for the regulation
to apply to noncommercial
speech (in any event, the City
did not appeal the District
Court’s decision to sever this
provision from the regulation).
The Court held that the regulation does not impermissibly
favor commercial speech over
noncommercial speech and that
it does not regulate speech
based upon content.

With respect to Desert’s as
applied challenge, the Court
noted that the Municipal Code
provides a at ban on such advertising and does not allow for
variances. Therefore, City ofcials had no discretion when
applying the law to Desert’s
signs. Turning to the amendment adopted by the City which
was extended to be eective for
90 days after the Court of Appeals decision at which time
the City will adopted permanent amendments to the Code,
the Court noted that the provision was adopted to eliminate
one of the four conditions required before a variance could
be granted (see above). Desert
argued that even with the elimination of this criteria, City ofcials were still left with undue
discretion to permit or deny
variances. The Court disagreed, nding that the remaining criteria, while not necessarily exact or explicit, were not
too abstract, and not signicantly concrete enough to restrict subjectivity. As a result,
the Court was satised that the
amended regulation ‘‘contains
appropriate standards cabining
the [City’s] discretion.’’ The
Ninth Circuit concluded that
the two sign ordinances challenged, as amended, are both
constitutional, facially and as
applied to Desert.
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In the third case, Outdoor
Media Group, Inc. v. City of
Beaumont, 2007 WL 3197112,
following a challenge to a denial of a permit to erect four
billboards at a highway intersection on the grounds that the
signs ‘‘would result in excessive, undue and adverse visual
intrusion . . . by adding unrelated advertising to a future
new commercial facility’’ and
because the billboards would
‘‘have a detrimental eect on
the general public, health,
safety and welfare by adversely
aecting existing views of open
space and visual relief and future views of new commercial
development,’’ the City of
Beaumont (California) repealed their sign ordinance and
replaced it with a new one that
specically bans new billboards. The original ordinance
was challenged on the grounds
that it granted discretion to the
planning commission without
standards for review, that it
regulated more commercial
speech than was necessary to
advance a substantial governmental interest, and that it impermissibly burdened noncommercial speech greater
than commercial speech and
favored some non-commercial
messages over others.
The City rst sought dismissal of the challenge that the
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billboard company failed to
exhaust its state administrative
remedies, but the Court explained that dierent from a
takings case, such action is not
a prerequisite to a proceeding
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Circuit Court did uphold the
District Court’s determination
that the repeal of the complained of sign ordinance
moots the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief since
there is no longer any risk that
the billboard company will be
subject to the challenged ordinance. The Court found no
merit to the argument that the
City would simply re-enact the
old ordinance at a later date,
noting, ‘‘The new ordinance,
forbidding all billboards, accomplishes the city’s stated
goals of limiting visual clutter
and preserving commercial viability of future developments,
meaning the city has no motive
to re-enact a constitutionally
suspect ordinance to accomplish the same objective.’’ The
Circuit Court found that the
new ordinance cures the constitutional deciencies complained of with respect to the
original ordinance since: the
ban on new billboards now
only requires the planning
commission to make a determination as to whether the pro-
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posed sign is an o-site sign,
and this does not constitute unbridled discretion; the rationale
for the new ordinance is based
on aesthetic harm which is a
substantial governmental interest; and the new ordinance contains a message substitution
clause that permits the substitution of noncommercial content
for existing copy on any otherwise permissible sign, curing
any potentially impermissible
burdens on noncommercial
speech caused by the o-site
ban. With respect to the billboard company’s due process
claim, the Circuit Court upheld
the District Court’s dismissal
nding that there was no vested
property right in an unapproved
billboard permit application.
However, the Circuit Court determined that the District Court
erred in dismissing the First
Amendment and Equal Protection claims on this ground since
the establishment of a vested
property right is irrelevant to
such a challenge.
With respect to the First
Amendment claims, the court
found that the old sign ordinance did not impermissibly
grant unbridled discretion to
the permitting authority, that it
was not an unconstitutional
regulation of commercial
speech, and that the ordinance

was not in violation of the overbreadth doctrine. The Court
also upheld the dismissal of the
Equal Protection claim, since
billboards are not in a protected
class and the regulation was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
The Circuit Court did nd,
however, that the old ordinance’s o-site ban was a broad
prohibition that seemed to
reach beyond o-site commercial copy and could include
noncommercial messages, and
that it lacked the safeguard of
the substitution clause contained in the new ordinance.
Furthermore, the Court noted
that the old ordinance may have
impermissibly regulated noncommercial speech on the basis
of content since it exempted
certain noncommercial o-site
signs from the permit requirement (e.g., political signs and
certain directional signs). Since
the case was before the court
on a motion to dismiss, the
Court said that record was not
yet ripe to fully consider these
claims.
Conclusion
With hundreds of reported
land use cases in the second
half of 2007, land use and real
estate lawyers are challenged
to keep current and to monitor
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the trends in fast-developing
areas within this practice. Law
of the Land oers one such vehicle, and provides readers with
an option of registering for
email notication as new cases
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are posted. When time permits,
check out the growing number
of land use law related blogs in
cyberspace. A rich amount of
information is available to assist in real estate practice.

